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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STA TE

OF

UTAH

CITY OF SOUTH OGDEN, a Utah
Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.

V'S•

16902

EMMA K. FUJIKI,

Defendant-Respondent

--------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

--------------------------------------------------NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is concerned with a determination of whether
certain admitted facts, together with allegations and admissions
in the pleadings,can justify a ruling that the plaintiff in a
condemnation action acquired possession of a property under
the proV'isions of Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
(as amended 1967), so as to justify the running of

statutory

interest on the final award, eV"en though no formal Order of
Occupancy was secured by the plaintiff condenmor.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower Court ruled that defendant condemnee was
entitled to receive interest on the stipulated agreed value
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of the property condeilUled and taken from and after the date
of the filing of the Answer to plaintiff's Complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This defendant seeks to have this Court affirm the
Judgment, including interest, as awarded by the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has generally recited the skeletal facts
setting forth the procedural sequence of the litigation;
however, respondent does not agree with appellant's statement
that it did not

"~

. . ever enter or take actual possession ... "

of the condenmed properties, since the quoted phrase raises
the mixed issue of fact and law which was before the lower
Court and which is the subject of

this appeal. Further, as

this argument proceeds, it will be necessary to add a few
additional supplemental facts in order to more clearly
explain what events transpired between the

time the

Complaint was filed and when the matter was brought before the
lower Court at the time of the Pre-Trial hearing.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
POSSESSION OF THE CONDEMNED PROPERTIES WAS
SURRENDERED TO PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME TiiE
ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WAS SERVED
In condemnation actions under Utah law the value of
real property taken for public use is determined as of the
date of the Service of Summons:
"78-34-11-- When right to damages deemed to have accrued-For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages,
the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at
the date of the service of summons, and its actual
value at that date shall be the measure of compensation
for all property to be actually taken, ... "
Although the foregoing statute fixes the valuation date,
interest on the value of the property taken begins to run from
the date the condemn.or takes actual possession of the property
or secures an order of occupancy , whichever is earlier, as
provided in a companion portion of the Code:
"78-34-9-- Occupancy of premises pending action-Deposit paid into court-- Procedure for payment of
compensation.-... and the said judgment shall
include, as part of the just compensation awarded,
interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount
finally awarded as the value of the property and
damages, from the date of taking actual possession
thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy,
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; ... "
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In this case South Ogden City connnenced condemnation
proceedings to acquire vacant land for a new City building
complex.

Rather than serve the Complaint through normal

channels, counsel for defendant

accepted service of the

Complaint ( R. 6), and simultaneously served an Answer ( R.5 )·
on plaintiff's attorney. The Complaint contained a special
prayer for relief in the following terms:
" Plaintiff further prays for an Order authorizing
immediate occupancy of the described premises for
the purpose of commencing construction." (R. 2)
In addition, the Complaint incorporated therein
Exhibit "A", which was the Resolution of the City Council
authorizing its attorney to proceed with the matter and to-"3. To obtain from said Court, an Order permitting the
City to take immediate possession and use of said real
property, ... "
( R. 3)
On October 27, 197 8, shortly after receiving the Complain

defendanes

attorney filed and served an Answer admitting the

entire Complaint, but setting up the issue of the valuation of
the property taken:
" 1. Defendant admits paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7,

and 8.

" 2. Defendant denies that plaintiff has offered to her
an amount of money which represents just compensation
for the properties being condemned. "
( R. 5)
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-5Further, the prayer for relief included in the Answer
affirmatively sought relief for interest in addition to the
fair market value of the lands being taken, in the following
statement:
"
together with interest thereon from the date of
the acceptance of service of Summons on October 25, 1978,
at the rate of 8% per annum, both before and after
judgment, until paid, ... "
( R. 5)
Relying on plaintiff's

representations in the pleadings

that it required inunediate occupancy of the lands to commence
construction, defendant immediately abandoned and surrendered
the property to the City and discontinued any further use of
it

( R. 25), a representation to the lower Court which was not

disputed by plaintiff. In fact , the subject land is directly
across the street from the present City offices ( R. 26). However, the plans for the City complex were not finished and,

as it developed, the delay was rather extensive ( R. 26).
The matter was set for Pre-Trial on November 19, 1979,
at which time the issue of whether plaintiff should pay interest
on any award from the date of acceptance of
and Complaint arose.

service of SUlIDllons

At the time it was agreed that the fair

market value of the property would be determined as of October 27:
1978, when acceptance

of Service became effective, and in fact
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the parties did subsequently agree as to the fair market value
of the property taken.
At the Pre-Trial hearing plaintiff initially contended
that it was necessary for an Order of Occupancy to issue before
interest would run on any award ( R. 26-27), but subsequently
attempted to convince the lower Court that it had not acquired
actual possession of the property-- contending, as its argument
. developed in substance, that " actual" possession of the property
should be S}"Ilonymous with going on the property and taking
"physical" possession. After argument on the matter the lower
Court issued its ruling as follows:
" OGDEN, UTAH

NOVEMBER 19, 1979

11:30 A.M.

THE COURT: The Court will rule as follows: That in this
Complaint there was an order-- that there was a Complaint filed
alleging a need for and praying for immediate possession of the
properties, and also alleging that they would be offered a
reasonable sum. The Answer denies that they have been offered
a reasonable sum, but admits all other pleadings.
The property apparently is truck farm property.
MR. STINE: Subdivision lots, if the Court please. That's--
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THE COURT:
MR. FULLER:

Subdivision?
The highest and best use would be sub-

division, but I think it had been used for crop farming.

THE COURT: The only practical use since the Summons
was made would not be-- no one can very well use it for a
subdivision.
MR. STINE: The highest and best use-- wasn't it zoned
for duplex at the time-- it's residential subdivision. They
had truck farmed it, row cropped it from time to time.
THE COURT: The Court will deem that the state of the
pleadings substantially destroys the value of the property,
and that if the city goes through, they'll have to pay interest-MR. STINE: From the date of-THE COURT: -- from the date of the Summons-- from the
date of the Answer when-- as soon as you knew that there
wasn't any issue on it.
MR. STINE: From the date of the Answer?
THE COURT:

Tha:' s right.

"

THE COURT: Okay. It is the date of the Answer; as soon
as they knew there was no issue and the possession could have
lawfully been taken any time they wanted to from then on. The
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value of the property as subdivision property had been
destroyed for the landowner's purpose. Possession has been
taken in the holding of the ground. That is the ruling of the
( See R. 21--South
Ogden City v. Oka No. 16903
for this portion of the
lower Court proceedings.)

Court."

If defendant had retained possession and the use of the
property after the commencement of the action, there would be
a logical argument that the constitutional mandate of paying
just compensation would be satisfied, and several Utah cases
so hold.

However, under the facts of this case, where the

pleadings emphatically recited the immediate need for occupancy
of the premises, and where defendant immediately surrendered
and abandoned the property to the City, it would indeed appear
unreasonable to require the property owner to forebear both
the use of her property and the alternative right to recover
interest on its value simply because South Ogden City

sub~

sequently realized that there would be delays in getting its
building plans prepared. Certainly, the Complaint and its
attached Exhibit clearly indicated that the City was ready to
go and that it wanted the property immediately. Under the
circumstaces, securing a formal Order of Occupancy was totally
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unnecessary.
Plaintiff had possession of the subject property as of
October 27, 1978, within the meaning of Section 78-34-9.
Plaintiff cites several Utah cases in support of its
position that interest is not allowable under the facts of this
case, but each and every cited case is inapposite; rather, a
careful reading of the cases supports the lower Court's ruling
that interest should be paid on the award under the facts of
this case.

In Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147,

80 Pac. 732, an award of interest was denied where the property
owner retained both possession and use of the condemned premises.
But in that case, contrary to the facts before this Court, it
was held that the condemner--" ... did not ask for and did not
have the possession of said lots, ... " before trial; and" Nor
was there any time when it could have taken possession and
giV"en a writ of assistance therefor until final judgment and
Order of Condemnation." Further, the Court stated that "
The condemn.or is not required to make that compensation, until
he does take, either actual or constructiV"ely."
Plaintiff also cites State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d
630 and State v. Bettilyon, Inc.,17 U. 2d

135,

263, 265 P.2d

405 P.2d

but neither case supports plaintiff's position. Peek

420,

recognizes
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that a taking occurs" .•. when the possession of the property
is actually surrendered, ... "and Bettilyon recognizes that
interest accrues" ... from the time of actual taking of

. ... "
possession
To paraphrase plaintiff's argument in its brief,
plaintiff had actual possession of the subject property both
in " fact" and in " reality". ( Br. 7) In weighing the equities
of this case, plaintiff ought to pay interest on the total award
from the time the property was abandoned and surrendered to the
City.
3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 8.63 states that-" ... the right to interest from the time that payment
ought to have been made until it is actually made
follows as a matter of strict constitutional right."
Similarly, in the case of State of Oregon, by and
through its D 0 T

v. Glenn ( 1979), 602 P. 2d 253, that Court,

interpreting a Constitutional provision similar to that of
Article !,Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, stated:
"Prior decisions of this Court have explained that
the interest award is part of the ' just compensation'
required by Article !,Section 18 of the Oregon
Constitution."
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POINT II
THE CONSTITIJTIONAL MANDATE REQUIRING PAYMENT
OF JUST COMPENSATION SHOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY TECHNICAL PROCEDURAL MANEUVERS
During recent years we have experienced an explosive growth
along the Wasatch Front in northern Utah, one of the results being
reflected in a substantial amount of condemnation activity. Not
all property owners have converted their lands from an established
use, such as row-crop farming as exists in this case, so as to take
immediate advantage of higher and better uses which have developed
in different localities.

Property owners have found that they can

continue farming a tract of land, even though it is ripe for subdivision development as here, and that the farming activities will
produce a given economic return and yet allow the owner to hold
on to the property for a sufficient period of time as will reflect
higher values over the years due to population pressures and the
effect of inflation.
On the other hand, by retaining properties and not

inmediately converting them to the highest use to which they
are adaptable at a given time, such open lands are fair game when
condemning agencies seek

sites for highways, public buildings,
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-12schools and the like. In fact, it is easy to see why condemners
might try to tie up such properties in advance of actual
public needs so as to head off any development of such unimproved lands. In this case, the lands being taken had value
because a subdivider would have purchased them on the date of
the service of Summons for the purpose of constructing single
family residences and duplexes in accordance with South Ogden
City zoning. As Judge Wahlquist recognized, the filing of the
Complaint effectively destroyed the highest and best use of
the subject property.
As a result of the foregoing situation, there has developed an interesting

and generally effective procedural tactic

on the part of some condemners whereby a property owner can
effectively be denied the recovery of just compensation under
the mandate of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution
by maneuvering within the framework of Sections 78-34-11 and
78-34-9. Here is the way it works: The condemner files and
serves its Complaint, thereby establishing a valuation date
for the property taken; however, to avoid the running of interest,
it does not seek an order of innnediate occupancy. Unless brought
into Court on a motion seeking to dismiss the .proceedings or force
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actual taking of possession ( which is no certain remedy for
the landowner in any event), the condemner will often do nothing
until the condemnee forces the matter to trial. This strategy is
being used more and more in an era of rapidly rising land prices,
as we have been experiencing in the past few years.
It is understandable that a condemnor might move as rapidly
as possible to file and serve its complaint so as to head off
rising land prices, but to also attempt to avoid the payment of
interest

or to recognize ever increasing land values up to the

time of actual trial often borders on unconscionable conduct.
Even if, as here, the statutory rate of interest at 8% per annum
is awarded to the property owner, this is far short of constitutional
just compensation where one nn.tst accept market values at the date
of the service of summons and complaint (plus 8% interest), when
in fact the market conditions are moving along at an incremental
rate of between 15% and 20% per annum, as was the situation in
South Ogden during 1978 and 1979.
Appellant seeks both to freeze market values in this case
as of October 27, 1978, and to deny either statutory interest
at 8% per annum or the alternative greater per annum increase in
the market value of the subject properties from and after that date.
The only excuse it can make is that, when it alleged in its
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-14Complaint and Resolution that it needed inunediate occupancy
to commence construction it really didn't mean what it claimed.
Appellant's actions do not square with its argument to this
Court.
In response to a somewhat similar situation in the case
of Kimball v. Salt Lake City,

32 U. 253, 90 Pac. 395, which

involved a condemnation proceeding for damages and interest
resulting from a change of the grade of a street in front of a
residence ( brought under Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 22),
our Court reflected:
" The adherence to
precedent is no doubt a commendable
judicial virtue, but, if carried to extremes, may
easily, like most virtues, border upon vice. The law
as declared by the Courts should not be permitted to
prevail against valid statutory enactments, and should
in no event curtail or minimize constitutional provisions."
( Emphasis added)
Appellate courts should ever be mindful of applying
existing statutory and case law to ever changing conditions,
particularly when new and unusual factual developments
permeating an economy must be considered and grappled with.
This case presents a situation requiring a logical and
practical application of the law and facts to the realities of
modern times.
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CONCllJSION
Plaintiff's abortive attempt to play hop sc~tch within
the statutory framework cannot prevail against the superior
and overriding mandate of the Utah Constitution requiring payment of just compensation to property owners who must unwillingly give up their lands through no fault of their own.
Of all legal areas involving court action, the field of eminent
domain should not be one where games are played.

The

lower

Court accurately analyzed the situation for what it actually
was, and ruled accordingly.
This matter was previously presented to this Court by
plaintiff on a Motion For Summary Reversal of Judgment, pursuant
to Rule 73 B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and was orally
argued on April 7, 1980; and the Motion was denied on the same
date. Plaintiff in pursuing this appeal has added little or
nothing to what it presented in its Motion, and it would appear
that this so-called Appeal is nothing more than a re-submission
of the Motion which was denied. The procedure being followed by
plaintiff, even if within the framework of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, certainly does not appear to comport with the
spirit and intent of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
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-16'!he Judgment of the lower Court awarding interest on the
stipulated award from and after the date of the service of the
Answer on October 27, 1978, should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

GLEN E. FULLER

678East SouthTempleStreet
Salt Lake- City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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